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Abstract 
Many studies have analysed the effect of financial development and bank competition 
on economic growth from a cross-country perspective. However, to our knowledge, no 
paper has analysed the effect of these two financial variables on growth at regional 
level. This paper examines the case of the Spanish regions in an attempt to fill this gap. 
Our results show that firms in industries with a greater dependence on external finance 
grow faster in more developed financial regions. The results also show that bank 
monopoly power has an inverted-U effect on economic growth, suggesting that market 
power has its highest effect at intermediate values. The effect is heterogeneous among 
firms according to the financial dependence of the industry they belong to. This result is 
consistent with the literature on relationship banking which argues that bank 
competition can have a negative effect on the availability of finance for more 
informationally opaque firms.  
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1. Introduction* 
 
In recent years, we have witnessed a reawakened interest in issues related to 
economic growth, and in analysing the importance of the correct functioning of 
financial institutions as a growth factor. Theories of financial intermediation have 
demonstrated how intermediaries help to overcome market frictions by reducing the 
costs of transferring information and wealth between savers and investors. Clearly, 
when financial systems perform their functions well, the cost of financial intermediation 
will be lower and economic growth will increase. 
 
The quality of the functions provided by the financial system (facilitating the 
trading of risk, allocating capital, monitoring managers, mobilising savings, and easing 
the trading of goods, services and financial contracts) can be approximated by aggregate 
measures of financial development. In this respect, “a growing body of work 
demonstrates a strong, positive link between financial development and economic 
growth, and there is even evidence that the level of financial development is a good 
predictor of future economic development” (Levine, 1993, pp. 703). 
 
However, Rajan and Zingales (1998) point out that the positive correlation 
normally found between financial development and economic growth may be due to a 
problem of omitted variable. Given that financial development depends on economies’ 
capacity to save and, according to the main growth theories, saving is the chief 
determinant of economic growth, then the observation of a positive relation between 
financial development and economic growth may be a consequence of the relationship 
these two variables have with the saving rate. The precise mechanism through which 
financial development fosters economic growth must therefore be identified. 
 
With this aim, Rajan and Zingales (1998) explore the relevance of the financial 
sector to find out whether industries that are more dependent on external finance grow 
faster in more financially developed countries. Much of the theoretical literature 
establishes that financial markets and banking institutions help to resolve problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazard, thereby reducing financing costs. In this way, 
financial development should help firms or sectors experiencing moral hazard and 
asymmetric information problems to obtain funds. Rajan and Zingales (1998) propose a 
test for this hypothesis, under the assumption that sectors with greater dependence on 
external financing will grow more rapidly when the financial markets they access are 
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more developed. Hence, their test analyse whether ex-ante financial development 
facilitates access to financing and therefore strengthens ex-post growth in more 
financially dependent sectors. The advantage of this approach is that it specifies one of 
the mechanisms by which the financial sector affects growth, providing a robust 
causality test that corrects for country and economic sector effects. In this way, the test 
does not depend so heavily on the usual macro-economic modelling found in the 
economic growth literature, which consists of explaining economic growth through 
proxy variables for financial development.  
 
As well as the importance of financial development, another subject of interest 
that has received much less attention is the influence of the degree of bank competition 
on economic growth. (As far as we know, only the papers by Cetorelli and Gambera, 
2001, Claessens and Laeven, 2005 and Maudos and Fernández de Guevara, 2006a have 
analysed this issue). From a theoretical (and also empirical) point of view, the literature 
on the subject shows ambiguous effects. Thus, on the one hand, the conventional 
economic theory teaches us that exercise of market power is associated with less credit 
availability, a higher interest rate and, therefore, lower economic growth. However, on 
the other hand, some authors argue that where market power exists, banks may have 
more incentive to invest in the acquisition of soft information by establishing close 
relationships with borrowers over time (relationship banking), facilitating the 
availability of credit and consequently reducing firms’ financial constraints 
(Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2005). In this scenario, banks can make their investments in 
relationships with clients profitable in the long term as a consequence of the existence 
of an information monopoly (Petersen and Rajan, 1995).  
 
Most research into the effect of financial development and/or bank competition 
on growth has adopted a cross-country perspective. However, the arguments used to 
confirm the importance of these two effects on growth are equally valid for a regional 
perspective application. The existence of major differences in the degree of financial 
development and bank competition among regions in the same country can help to 
explain the differences observed in regional growth rates. 
 
As pointed out by Carbó, López and Rodríguez (2006), the analysis of the 
relationship between financial development (and bank competition) and growth from a 
regional perspective (rather than from a cross-country perspective) has several 
advantages. First, the use of regions within a country implies that institutional, legal, 
cultural, etc. factors are more adequately controlled, since there are fewer differences 
among regions than among countries. Second, there is greater availability and 
homogeneity of information for regions (of a specific country) than for countries. And 
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third, the relevant financial market (and therefore, the measurement of financial 
development and bank competition) is more accurately defined at regional level. 
Furthermore, the mean values of the national variables used in cross-country studies 
may conceal important differences among regions.  
  
In this context, the purpose of this study is to provide empirical evidence of the 
effect of financial development and bank competition on the economic growth of 
Spanish firms using the methodological approach proposed by Rajan and Zingales 
(1998). The Spanish case provides a good testing ground to analyse these issues because 
of the significant differences among regions both in terms of financial development and 
of the competitive rivalry in the banking markets. In addition, disaggregated 
information at province level (NUTS 3) is available for the 52 Spanish provinces, thus 
enabling us to more precisely define the most relevant financial markets for firms and to 
more accurately measure both financial development and bank competition. 
 
The main innovative contributions of this study are as follows. First, the study 
combines information at firm level with information on the financial markets in the 
provinces. Thus, similarly to the study by Guiso et al. (2004), we extend the approach 
proposed by Rajan and Zingales using a large panel of firm-level data (in our case for 
Spanish companies). The main advantage of using firm-level data is that they allow us 
to see whether financial development and bank competition affect firms differently, 
depending on the size of the group they belong to. Theoretically, we do not expect all 
firms to be equally affected by regional financial development and bank competition, 
considering that larger firms can more easily raise funds in markets at a distance from 
their main headquarters. For that reason, our a priori assumption is that the effect of 
financial development and bank competition on growth will be greater for small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs). Second, in contrast to other studies that analyse the effect 
of bank competition on economic growth or on firms’ financial constraints, the database 
we use provides information on the banks each firm operates with, and we are therefore 
able to measure the effect of bank market power more accurately. Thus, while previous 
studies measure the competitive rivalry of the banking market in which the borrowing 
firm has its headquarters, in our case, we can directly measure the market power of the 
banks the firm actually deals with. Third, apart from using bank market concentration as 
an indicator of competition, we use a market power indicator from the industrial 
organisation literature –the Lerner index- given the limitations of structural indicators 
based on market concentration. Furthermore, the methodological approach used allows 
us to estimate Lerner indices separately for the loan market, rather than for all banking 
activity. We can therefore more precisely measure the effect on firm growth of bank 
market power in setting loan interest rates. Fourth, in contrast to previous studies of the 
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Spanish case, our bank competition indicators take into account all the banking firms 
competing in the Spanish market, incorporating not only commercial banks into the 
analysis, but also savings banks and cooperative banks. And fifth, as province-level 
information is available, financial variables are measured for the 52 provinces 
(NUTS3=provincias in Spain), rather than for the 17 regional administrative territories 
(Comunidades Autónomas or NUTS2) in Spain1. The financial development and bank 
competition indicators for the province in which each firm has its headquarters can 
therefore be more accurately attributed to individual firms. 
 
In line with previous studies, our results confirm the positive effect of financial 
development on the economic growth of firms with a greater dependency on external 
finance. The results also show that bank monopoly power has an inverted-U effect on 
economic growth, suggesting that market power has its highest effect at intermediate 
values. The effect is heterogeneous among firms according to the financial dependence 
of the industry firms belong to: firms from sectors that are more dependent on external 
finance enjoy a beneficial effect from bank market power. This result is consistent with 
the literature on relationship banking which argues that bank competition can have a 
negative effect on the availability of finance for more informationally opaque firms 
(SMEs) by reducing the expected benefits of the investments in obtaining specific 
information from clients.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we review the 
existing literature on the influence of financial development and bank competition on 
economic growth. Section 3 describes the methodology used for measuring bank market 
power, external financial dependence and the specification used to analyse the effect of 
regional financial development and bank competition on economic growth. Section 4 
describes the sample and variables used. The main empirical results are provided in 
section 5. The summary of the results, conclusions and policy implications are 
presented in section 6.  
 
 
2. Related literature 
 
Financial development and economic growth 
 
                                                 
1 See Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003 on 
the establishment of a common classification of territorial units for statistics (NUTS). 
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The seminal work on the link between financial development and economic 
growth is that of Goldsmith (1969), who used the value of intermediate assets as a 
percentage of the GDP as an indicator of financial development, under the assumption 
that the size of the financial sector is positively correlated with the provision and quality 
of its services. Using data from 35 countries for the period 1860-1963, he concluded 
that there was a parallelism between economic growth and financial development in 
periods of several decades. However, as Levine (1993) points out, Goldsmith’s work 
has certain limitations: a) it does not control for the effect of other variables relevant to 
explaining growth; b) the proxy variable used to measure the correct functioning of the 
financial sector has certain drawbacks; and c) the direction of causality is not identified.  
 
During the nineties, various studied provided empirical evidence in attempts to 
solve the problems presented by Goldsmith’s (1969) work. King and Levine (1993a and 
b) substantially extended the sample of countries (80 countries), controlled for the 
influence of other variables affecting economic growth, constructed new indicators of 
financial development and analysed their influence on a variety of economic growth 
dimensions (GDP per capita, capital-labour ratio and total factor productivity). Their 
results showed a strong positive correlation between financial development and 
economic growth indicators, and that initial levels of development are a good predictor 
for growth rates of production, capital and productivity in the following 30 years. 
 
Levine and Zervos (1998) used a sample of 49 countries over the period 1976-93 
to investigate whether different measures of financial development predict future 
growth rates of production, capital, productivity and saving. Their results showed a 
positive and significant correlation between the two groups of variables, even when 
other explanatory variables were controlled for in the estimation. The results indicate 
that financial markets and institutions provide the services necessary to guarantee long 
term economic growth. 
  
The work of Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) evaluates whether the exogenous 
component of financial intermediation development has an influence on economic 
growth, and whether differences in the legal and accounting systems among countries 
explain the differences in their levels of financial development. Their results show that 
the exogenous component of financial intermediation development is positively 
associated with economic growth. They also show that differences in legal systems and 
accounting practices go some way to explaining the differences in financial 
development among countries. These two results indicate that legal and accounting 
reforms (that strengthen the rights of creditors and the execution of contracts) and the 
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transparency and effectiveness of accounting practices can, in turn, foster financial 
development and accelerate economic growth. 
 
Finally, Loayza and Rancière (2006) analyse the apparent contradiction in two 
branches of the literature on the effects of financial development on growth. On one 
hand, the literature on economic growth finds a positive relation between the two 
variables; on the other, the literature on bank crises finds that monetary aggregates are 
good predictors of economic crises. These authors show how this apparent contradiction 
can be explained in terms of the differences between short term (negative) and long 
term (positive) effects associated with the task of intermediation between saving and 
investment.  
 
As we outlined in the introduction, the study that specified the mechanism by 
which financial development fosters economic growth is that of Rajan and Zingales 
(1998). Previous studies had simply verified the existence of a positive correlation 
between the two variables, without establishing the direction of causality. Although 
King and Levine (1993a) specifically explore this problem of causality and show that 
the predetermined component of financial development is a good predictor of growth 
over a period of 10 to 30 years, Rajan and Zingales (1998 and 2001) put forward two 
arguments that question these results. First, the positive correlation between financial 
development and economic growth might reflect the existence of a problem of an 
omitted variable, such as the saving rate, which is related to both variables. Second, the 
proxy variables for financial development (such as market capitalisation as a percentage 
of GDP) may be leading indicators that anticipate future growth rather than casual 
factors. For these reasons, Rajan and Zingales’ contribution was to design an empirical 
test that specifies the mechanism by which finance affects growth, thus providing a 
stronger test of causality. The mechanism they consider is that financial development 
facilitates firm access to external finance, particularly to those firms that depend most 
heavily on external finance, thus favouring increased investment and economic growth.  
 
Taking the European case as their reference, Guiso, Jappelli, Padula and Pagano 
(2004) analyse the importance of financial development and financial integration in 
explaining differences in economic growth using both sectoral and firm level data. 
Following the methodology of Rajan and Zingales (1998), their results once again 
confirm the positive effect of financial development on economic growth. Moreover, 
these authors used a wide range of simulations to analyse the effects of an advance on 
the degree of integration in European financial markets, finding a positive effect on 
economic growth. The greatest effects would take place if a similar level of financial 
integration was reached in Europe as in the United States, although major differences 
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exist between countries. Countries with weaker financial structures (Belgium, Denmark, 
Greece and Italy) would reap the greatest benefits, while the effects would be more 
modest in more financially developed countries (United Kingdom, Switzerland and the 
Netherlands). 
 
 Although the regional perspective is increasingly important in monetary and 
financial research (see a survey in Dow and Fuentes, 1997), the effect of financial 
development on growth has scarcely been explored on a regional scale2, perhaps as a 
consequence of the lack of suitable databases to consider financial development. The 
exception is the case of Spain, where recent studies by Carbó and Rodríguez (2004) and 
Carbó, López and Rodríguez (2006) are of particular interest. In the first case, these 
authors employ dynamic causality and panel data techniques to find that lending 
dependence confers banks a special role in promoting regional economic growth. In the 
second case, Carbó, López and Rodríguez (2006) show that banking sector development 
and financial innovation in banking positively contribute to regional GDP, investment 
and gross savings growth. 
 
 
Bank competition and growth 
 
As mentioned in Maudos and Fernández (2006a), the direct or indirect effect of 
bank competition on economic growth has been analysed in two areas of research. In 
the first case, in the area of the relationship lending (see a survey in Boot, 2000), some 
studies have analysed the effect of bank competition on the cost of financing and on 
credit availability, which affects investment and economic growth. In the second case, a 
small number of studies have directly analysed the effect of bank competition on 
economic growth using aggregate sector information for a sample of countries. 
 
One of the studies with the greatest repercussions for the analysis of the effect of 
bank competition in determining the value of the relationship between the bank and the 
borrowing firm is that of Petersen and Rajan (1995). These authors develop a theoretical 
model that demonstrates how when banking markets are competitive, banks have fewer 
incentives to invest in relationship building and borrowing firms are subject to greater 
financial constraints. The model was tested empirically with data on American SMEs 
and shows that firms situated in more competitive (less concentrated) markets are 
subject to greater financial constraints.  
 
                                                 
2In the context of the growth-finance nexus, studies that adopt a regional perspective include Williams 
and Gardener (2003) and Mackay and Molyneux (1996).  
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In the area of relationship lending, other papers have analysed the effect of 
relationship banking on firms’ financing constraints by controlling for the influence of 
bank competition. D’Auria et al. (1999) found that an increase in concentration causes 
an increase in the cost of financing, although the economic impact is very small. 
Angelini et al. (1998) show that concentration is not a statistically significant variable 
on financial conditions, in contrast to the evidence offered by Petersen and Rajan 
(1995).  
 
One issue that has received little attention is whether the results of the effect of 
bank market power on firm financing constraints obtained in studies of bank-firm 
relationships are robust to the use of different competition indicators. In this vein, the 
only exception is the study by Carbó, Rodríguez and Udell (2006) who analyse the 
effect bank competition has on the financial constraints on Spanish SMEs. These 
authors were the first to use a competition indicator from the industrial organisation 
(IO) literature –the Lerner index- as an alternative to traditional measures of 
concentration. They find that the results are sensitive to the choice between IO margins 
and traditional concentration measures. Their results show that the Lerner index is a 
more consistent indicator of market power, and cast doubt on the validity of relying on 
concentration measures as proxies of competition in corporate lending relationships.  
 
Using aggregate information for a sample of countries, a small number of studies 
have directly analysed the effect of bank competition on economic growth. Cetorelli and 
Gambera (2001) extend the model of Rajan and Zingales (1998) by introducing bank 
market concentration as an explanatory variable of growth. Their results provide 
evidence that bank concentration promotes growth of sectors most in need of external 
finance by facilitating credit access to firms, especially younger ones. 
 
 Given the limitations on the use of indicators of market concentration to proxy 
competition, the recent study by Claessens and Laeven (2005) is the first to analyse the 
effect of bank competition on economic growth using an indicator of competition based 
on the theory of industrial organisation. Specifically, Claessens and Laeven use the 
results of a previous study in which they calculate the H-statistic for 20 countries, 
though the analysis of its effect on economic growth is reduced to 16 countries. Their 
main conclusion is that the most competitive banking systems can reduce hold-up 
problems and financial intermediation costs, favouring the access of firms to external 
finance. Furthermore, given the low degree of correlation between the H-statistic and 
market concentration, the indicators of bank market concentration do not help to 
forecast sector growth. 
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Finally, Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2006a) analyse the effect of 
financial development and bank competition on economic growth using both structural 
measures of competition and measures based on the new empirical industrial 
organization perspective (the Lerner index and the H-statistic). This paper also extends 
the number of sectors included in previous papers by considering not only 
manufacturing industries, but also the services sector. The evidence obtained in the 
period 1993-2003 for a sample of 53 sectors in 21 countries indicates that financial 
development and the exercise of bank market power promote economic growth. They 
argue that the latter result is consistent with the literature on relationship lending which 
affirms that bank competition can have a negative effect on the availability of finance 
for companies that are informationally more opaque. Once again, their results cast doubt 
on the use of market concentration measures as indicators of competition. 
 
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1. Model specification 
 Following other recent papers, the model of reference for analysing the effect of 
regional financial development and bank competition on economic growth takes as its 
starting point the specification adopted in Rajan and Zingales (1998) and subsequently 
expanded in Cetorelli and Gambera (2001), Claessens and Laeven (2005) and Maudos 
and Fernández de Guevara (2006a) to analyse the effect of bank competition on 
economic growth.  
In the initial study by Rajan and Zingales (1998), the specification focuses on 
analysing the effect of financial development, and consequently on testing whether the 
industries most dependent on external finance present higher rates of growth in 
countries with a higher level of financial development. Thus, they examine the 
differential effect of a common level of financial development on different industries 
within a country. The virtues of the test are that a) it looks for evidence of a specific 
mechanism by which finance affects growth, thus providing a stronger test of causality, 
and b) it corrects for fixed country and industry effects. As a result, the empirical test is 
less dependent on a specific macroeconomic growth model.  
 The expansion of the Rajan and Zingales model to test the effect of the degree of 
bank competition on growth takes into account the mechanism by which bank 
competition affects growth, namely through firms’ financial dependence. Thus the 
introduction of the financial dependence variable interacting with the indicator of bank 
competition allows us to verify whether firms that require the most external finance 
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grow faster in regions with more competitive banking markets (or if they operate with 
more competitive banks), or whether, on the contrary, higher levels of market power 
facilitate access to finance for firms that would not have obtained it in highly 
competitive contexts. Thus, following the specification of Claessens and Laeven (2005) 
and Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2006a), the model to be estimated is the 
following: 
1 2
4
5   ,
Region
*
*
ψ ψ
ψ
ψ ε
= + + +
+
+
jik j k
j k
j k or i j k
Growth Constant Sector dummies Dummies
External Dependence Financial Development
External Dependence Bank Competition
 (1) 
where i=firm, j=sector, k=the region (province) where the firm is located, Growth= the 
firm’s average real sales growth rate, and Bank competition is the indicator of the 
degree of bank competition in region k (Lerner index or, alternatively, an indicator of 
market concentration). The sector and region dummies capture the influence of effects 
specific to each sector or region, respectively.  
 
3.2. The measurement of bank competition 
 
In most studies that analyse the influence of bank competition on growth or firms’ 
financing constraints, the competitiveness of the banking industry is proxied by a 
market concentration index. However, recent studies (Berger et al., 2004; Maudos and 
Fernández de Guevara, 2004 and 2006a and b; Fernández de Guevara et al., 2005; 
Fernández de Guevara and Maudos, 2007; Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Carbó, 
Rodriguez and Udell, 2006, among others) have shown the limitations of proxying bank 
competition intensity with concentration measures, pointing to the need to use 
alternative indicators. For this reason, we use a competition indicator from the new 
empirical industrial organization approach: the Lerner index.  
 
The Lerner index measures the capacity to set interest rates above marginal costs as 
a proportion of prices. This market power indicator is usually derived from the Monti-
Klein model, which under standard assumptions (see Freixas and Rochet, 1997; and 
Maudos and Fernández de Guevara, 2006b), the first order condition of a profit 
maximization problem yields the following expression for the loan market: 
  
 
*
* *
1
( )ε
⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦
=
L L
L L L
r r mc
r N r
 (2) 
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where rL and r are the interest rates of loans (L) and interbank market, respectively, mcL 
is the marginal operating costs, εL is the elasticity of demand for loans, and the 
expression of the Lerner index appears on the left hand side of the equation.  
The estimation of the Lerner index has been applied in the studies by Angelini 
and Cetorelli (2003), Fernández de Guevara et al. (2005), Maudos and Fernández de 
Guevara (2004 and 2006a and b), Fernández de Guevara and Maudos (2007), Carbó, 
Humphrey and Rodríguez (2003), Carbó, Rodríguez and Udell (2006), among others. 
However, only in Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2006a and b) the Lerner index is 
estimated separately for loans (and deposits)3.  
 
Marginal operating costs are estimated from a translog cost function, where 
operating costs (c) depend on two outputs (L=loans, and D=deposits), two input prices 
(w1=price of labour and w2= price of physical capital) and technical change proxied by a 
time dummy (Trend)4: 
2 2 2
2
1 2
1ln ln ln ln ln ln ln ln
2
1 1 1(ln ) (ln ) ln ln ln
2 2 2
1ln ln ln ln
2
ln
γ γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ γ
γ μ μ μ μ
μ
= + + + +
+ + + +
+ + + + +
+ +
∑ ∑∑
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∑
∑
it h hit L it D it hm hit mit LD it it
LL it DD it h ht hit ithL
hit it L it D ithD
hit ih
c w L D w w L D
L D w w L
w D Trend Trend Trend L Trend D
Trend w u t
 (3) 
According to this expression, operating marginal costs for loans are given by the 
following equation: 
 ln ln ln
it
it it
L L LL it hit LD it LhL
it it
c cmc L w D Trend
L L
γ γ γ γ μ∂ ⎡ ⎤= = + + + +⎣ ⎦∂ ∑  (4) 
In order to test the robustness of results, we also use bank market concentration 
as an indicator of competition. Specifically, we use the Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
(HHI), which is defined as the sum of the square of the market shares of all the banks 
(commercial banks, savings banks, and cooperative banks) that compete in the market. 
As in other studies referring to the Spanish economy (Carbó, Humphrey and Rodríguez, 
2003; Fernández de Guevara and Maudos, 2007; among others), we consider that the 
regional market (specifically the province) is the most relevant for evaluating 
competition, given that many financial institutions are in fact present in just one or a 
                                                 
3 The other papers estimate a Lerner index for all banking activity as the ratio (price of total assets-
marginal costs of total assets)/price. 
4 Symmetry and linear homogeneity in input prices restrictions are imposed. 
 13
few provinces. Since the only information available for each bank at province level is 
the distribution of its branch network, we use this variable as proxy for banking output 
for the purposes of calculating the market concentration in each province. 
 
 
3.3. The measurement of external financial dependence 
 Following the approach in Rajan and Zingales (1998), papers that analyse the 
effect of financial development on growth measure the external financial dependence at 
the industry level using as a benchmark a country with developed capital markets in 
which firms do not face frictions in their access to financing. For the same reason, the 
external financing needs are computed for large firms, as SMEs face more financial 
restrictions. 
In our case, the financial dependence for each Spanish industry is measured 
using the information for large firms. Specifically, we follow the recommendation of 
the European Commission 96/280/CE on the definition of large firms in terms of the 
number of employees (firms with more than 250 employees).  
As Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue, the use of a benchmark is based on the 
assumption that there are technological reasons (project scale, gestation period, etc.) 
why some industries depend on external finance more than others, and that these 
reasons are the same in all countries (in our case, regions). Thus, the assumption is that 
if an industry in a specific region has certain technological characteristics, those same 
characteristics will be present in the rest of the regions in the sample analysed. In other 
words, we examine whether a firm in a specific industry that is more dependent on 
external financing grows relatively faster in a region that is more financially developed. 
 
4. Data, sample and variables used 
Estimation of equation (1) requires combining information on the firm’s growth 
and the financial development and bank competition of the province where the firm has 
its main headquarters. In the first case, as in Guiso et al. (2004), economic growth is 
proxied by the annual sales growth rate on the basis of the SABI (Sistema de Análisis de 
Balances Ibéricos) database provided by Bureau Van Dijk, which contains financial and 
economic information for a large sample of Spanish firms. Due to the scarcity of 
information from 2004 onwards, the period considered runs from 1997 to 2003. 
However, considering that data is only available over shorter time intervals for many 
firms, we compute the average annual growth rate for each firm using the available 
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sample for each firm. The growth variable is merged with regional-level data on 
indicators of financial development and bank competition and sector-level data on 
financial dependence. Real sales growth rates are computed using the value added 
deflators for the same sectors of activity (2 digits of NACE rev. 1) obtained from 
Spanish National Accounts (Source: National Institute of Statistics). 
The information on financial development is proxied by one of the most 
commonly used variables, such as the private credit/GDP ratio. The information is taken 
from the Bank of Spain (private credit) and from the National Institute of Statistics 
(GDP)5.  
Financial dependence is also proxied using information from the SABI database. 
For each firm, SABI offers information on the sector of activity to which it belongs 
according to different sector classifications. Specifically, the SABI data used were 
obtained according to the NACE Rev. 1 classification (59 industries). As in other 
papers, we restrict our attention to manufacturing firms (agricultural, mining/extraction 
or energy companies were excluded) in order to reduce dependence on regional-specific 
factors. However, as in Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2006a), we included the 
private service sectors of the economy taking into account its important contribution to 
the GDP (53% of the Spanish GDP in 2003). From the services sector we excluded the 
financial sector (financial intermediation, insurance and pension funding, and financial 
intermediation auxiliary activities). With these criteria, we selected firms from 38 
industries.   
As in Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2006a), the degree of external 
financial dependence is proxied by the ratio of debt with cost to current liabilities. 
Specifically, the definition used is as follows: 
 [ ] [ : ]
[ ] [ : ] [ ]
Noncurrent liabilities Current liabilities loans
Total assets Current liabilities creditors Other current liabilities
+
− −
 (5) 
With data on the large firms defined above, ratio (5) is calculated for each sector, 
aggregating the firms’ data for each year in the numerator and in the denominator. 
Subsequently we obtain the average of the annual data during the period 1997-2003, so 
that the degree of financial dependence refers to the average for the period. As 
                                                 
5 Market capitalization of listed firms and the sum of private credit and market capitalization (as a 
percentage of GDP) are other frequently used variables to proxy financial development. However, 
because the securities market is national in Spain, no information is available on market capitalization of 
firms by regions. As SMEs do not have access to securities markets, we check our results by splitting the 
sample into large and small firms. It must also be taken into account that the Spanish financial structure is 
strongly based on financial intermediaries rather than on markets. Hence, the absence of the market 
capitalization variable would have less impact on the results than in other countries. 
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suggested by Rajan and Zingales (1998), using the average of the data smoothes 
temporal fluctuations and reduces the effects of outliers. Altogether, for the large firms, 
information is available for 1,204 firms.  
In the case of the Lerner index, the statistical sources used are the balance sheets 
and profit and loss accounts of the commercial banks, savings banks and cooperative 
banks published by the AEB (Asociación Española de Banca), CECA (Confederación 
Española de Cajas de Ahorros) and UNACC (Unión Nacional de Cooperativas de 
Crédito)6, respectively. The sample includes practically all the financial institutions 
operating in Spain during the period 1997-2003. From the total of banks existing in each 
year, we eliminated those for which any of the variables required to estimate the Lerner 
index and its determinants was not available, as well as some observations that we can 
describe as statistical outliers. With these criteria, the sample used represents more than 
90% of the total bank assets in Spain.   
The loan interest rate (rL) is computed as the ratio of interest income divided by 
loans. The money market rate is proxied by the annual inter-bank deposit rate (reported 
by the Bank of Spain). Marginal operating costs are calculated by estimating equation 
(3). As panel data are available, fixed effects are introduced in the estimation of the 
costs function to capture the effect of possible unobserved variables specific to each 
bank 
To calculate the indices of market concentration we use the provincial 
distribution of the bank branch network as this is the only regional information available 
at bank level (regional branch distribution in each province). This information is also 
supplied by AEB, CECA and UNACC. As mentioned above, bank market concentration 
is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. 
The database used to calculate the sales growth rate for each firm (SABI) 
specifies the name of the banks each firm operates with. Consequently, in contrast to 
other studies that analyse the effect of bank competition on economic growth or on the 
firms’ financial constraints, we can measure the market power of the banks that each 
borrowing firm operates with. In this way, rather than analysing the effect of the degree 
of competition in the regional banking market where the firm has its headquarters, we 
                                                 
6 As far as we know, this is the only paper that includes credit cooperatives in the analysis of competition 
for the Spanish banking sector. Although the aggregate for the Spanish credit cooperative banking sector 
accounts for only about 5% of the total market assets, it should be remembered that these entities play an 
important role in some provinces. For example, according to the aggregate statistics provided by the Bank 
of Spain, in five provinces (Teruel, Navarra, Zamora, Soria and Almeria) the share of credit granted by 
cooperative banks is more than 20% of the total credit in the province. Omitting them from the analysis of 
the importance of financial development (and bank competition) on economic growth can seriously bias 
the results. 
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can more thoroughly analyse the effect of the market power of the banks that the 
borrower actually operates with. This second approach is clearly much more rigorous, 
given that a firm’s headquarters may be located in a bank market with a low (high) level 
of competition, but it may operate with a very competitive (uncompetitive) bank. 
Of all the firms in the SABI database, we eliminated those for which information 
on the banks they operate with is not available. We also eliminated firms with assets 
below 500,000 euros (micro firms), due to the inferior quality of accounting information 
in these firms (see Dechow and Dichev, 2002). In fact, micro-firms’ annual accounts are 
only audited in exceptional circumstances, and many of them are simply shell 
companies, with no trading activity, whose key operations are not typical of a firm 
providing goods or services. Firms that did not have information available to calculate 
any one of the variables required for the estimation were also eliminated. Following 
these criteria, the final sample had a total of 11,142 observations (see table 1). 
>Table 1 here< 
5. Empirical results 
Figure 1 shows the value of the financial development indicator (credit to the 
private sector/GDP) for the Spanish provinces. Specifically, the map classifies the 
provinces in quartiles according to their level of financial development. Significant 
differences can clearly be seen among regions: while the mean value of financial 
development is 0.71, the minimum value is 0.44 (corresponding to the province of 
Ourense) and the maximum is 1.22 (Madrid). The provinces with the highest level of 
financial development are Madrid, those in the Mediterranean basin (Barcelona, 
Valencia, Castellón, Alicante, Almería, Murcia) and Vizcaya (in the Basque Country). 
At the other extreme, Ourense, Teruel and Ciudad Real have the lowest levels of 
financial development (with values below 0.50). 
>Insert Figure 1 here< 
Table 2 shows the degree of external financial dependence for the different 
sectors of activity. The sectors presenting the highest level of external financial 
dependence are “Real estate activities” (0.67), “Renting of machinery and equipment” 
(0.66), “Air transport” (0.65) and “Land transport” (0.65). The lowest level of financial 
dependence corresponds to the “Recycling” (0.07), and “Manufacture of motor 
vehicles” (0.19) sectors. 
>Insert Table 2 here< 
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 Concerning the bank competition indicators, figure 2 shows the regional 
distribution of the Lerner index in the loan market. The value for each province is 
computed as a weighted average of the Lerner indices of the bank institutions with 
branches in that province, weighting with the number of branches of each bank. The 
existence of inequalities among provinces is also confirmed, although they are lower 
than the inequalities found in terms of financial development7. 
 >Insert Figure 2 here< 
 Regional differences are sharper in terms of bank market concentration. Thus, 
while the average HHI value is 1,390, the variation interval ranges from a minimum 
value of 790 (corresponding to Valencia) and a maximum of 2,406 (Teruel). 
Distribution by quartiles, shown in figure 3, indicates that the lower levels of banking 
market concentration (values below 1,000) correspond to Valencia, Madrid, Seville, 
Alicante and Castellón, while the highest levels (values over 2,000) are found in 
Cuenca, Soria, Ávila and Teruel. If we take as our reference the HHI value used in USA 
by regulators to approve or reject a merger (the 1,800/200 rule8), nine Spanish provinces 
have HHIs over 1,800 and, consequently, the bank market concentration is very high. 
>Insert Figure 3 here< 
The estimation of the effect of financial development and bank competition on 
economic growth is based on equation (1) where the dependent variable is the average 
annual real growth rate in firm sales over the period 1997-2003. Industry and regional 
dummies are introduced in each regression, estimated by ordinary least squares. 
Initially, we present the results referring to the effect of financial development on 
economic growth, without including the proxies for bank competition. At the end of 
each table we provide the estimation of the economic impact associated with financial 
development and bank competition. Specifically, the last rows of the tables show the 
differential in real sales growth (in percentage terms) between a firm situated in an 
industry at the 75th percentile level of external dependence and a firm situated in an 
industry at the 25th percentile level when the firm is located in a province at the 75th 
percentile of financial development (bank competition) rather than in one at the 25th 
percentile (with less financial development and a higher level of competition). Table 3 
contains the statistics of the variables used. 
                                                 
7  The coefficient of variation is 0.08 in terms of the Lerner index across provinces and 0.20 in terms of 
financial development. The Lerner index average is 0.33 and the maximum and minimum are 0.39 and 
0.28, respectively.   
8 According to this rule, if the post-merger market HHI is lower than 1,800 points, and the increase in the 
index from the pre-merger situation is less than 200 points, the merger is presumed to have no 
anticompetitive effects and therefore is approved by the regulators. Thus, if the merger does not violate 
the 1,800/200 rule, the application is approved without further investigation (see, Cetorelli, 1999). 
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>Insert Table 3 here< 
Column 1 of table 4 shows the results from Rajan and Zingales’ basic 
specification. The coefficient of the interaction term between financial development and 
financial dependence is positive and statistically different from zero at the 1% level, 
indicating that financial development affects growth, particularly in those sectors that 
rely more heavily on external finance. The differential in real sales growth going from a 
situation of low regional financial development to one of higher development translates 
into approximately 0.55 percentage points of growth in the more financially dependent 
sectors. This result is in line with prior studies (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Cetorelli and 
Gamberra, 2001; Guiso et al., 2004; Claessens and Laeven, 2005; and Maudos and 
Fernández de Guevara, 2006a) that obtain evidence favourable to the hypothesis that 
financial development facilitates economic growth. 
 The second column shows the results when the effect of bank competition, 
measured by bank market concentration (HHI), is introduced into the regression. The 
effect of financial development remains and the coefficient of the interaction term 
between financial dependence and the HHI is positive but not statistically different from 
zero. Although the effect of bank market concentration is not statistically significant, the 
positive sign is in line with the evidence obtained by Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) who 
find that the most concentrated banking sectors promote the economic growth of sectors 
that depend more heavily on external finance9.  
 To check for non-linearity, the third column adds a squared term of the 
interaction term between financial dependence and bank market concentration. 
Although the sign of the squared term is negative, it is not statistically different from 
zero. In any event, in line with Cetorelli and Gambera (2001), this result points to a 
potential inverted-U effect of bank competition on economic growth. 
 If, instead of using the HHI as proxy for bank competition, we introduce into the 
regression the Lerner index of the province where the firm has its headquarters (column 
4), the effect is negative and statistically significant, implying that greater market power 
does not generate greater economic growth. However, if we check for non-linearity 
(column 5), the effect of bank market power on growth is not statistically significant 
(neither the interaction term nor the squared term is statistically different from zero). 
 As mentioned above, the SABI database reports which banks each firm operates 
with. This information enables us to compute the mean Lerner index for these banks. 
                                                 
9 Claessens and Laeven (2005) obtain a negative coefficient for the interaction of concentration with 
financial dependence, although the coefficient is not significantly different from zero. 
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This variable reflects the effect of bank competition on growth much more rigorously 
and accurately than the mean Lerner index of the banks competing in each province. 
 Column (6) of table 4 shows that when the interaction term between financial 
dependence and the Lerner index is introduced in the estimation, the coefficient is not 
statistically different from zero. However, if the square of the interaction term is 
included (column 7), we find that bank market power has an inverted-U effect as the 
level of the interaction term is positive (and statistically significant) and the squared 
term is negative (and statistically different from zero). This result is in concordance with 
Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) and suggests that the overall growth potential of the 
firms’ sales is highest at intermediate values of market power, since sectors in an 
intermediate interval of the distribution of external dependence benefit substantially. 
This is due to the fact that with moderate levels of market power, banking firms 
capitalise on the advantages derived from investing in lasting relationships with their 
clients, and can thereby overcome the typical problems of asymmetric information and 
moral hazard associated with the task of financial intermediation. Therefore, while firms 
still have to bear higher financing costs, they are faced with fewer restrictions to 
financing. This greater finance availability is what subsequently leads to a higher sales 
growth. However, once a certain threshold has been crossed, increases in market power 
are detrimental to firms, as the higher financial costs they face outweigh the advantages 
associated with greater credit availability10.  
>Insert Table 4 here<  
The magnitude of the total differential effect of bank market power (proxied by 
the Lerner index of banks that borrowers deal with) on sales growth is positive (0.343 
pp.) and statistically different from zero due to the fact that the squared term is larger 
than the level term. Taking into account the non-linear relationship, the maximum effect 
of the interaction between external financial dependence and bank market power on 
growth occurs when the value of the interaction term is 0.16 (see figure 4). This value is 
close to the sample mean (and median) of 0.16 (see table 3), which implies that for a 
large number of firms (for 50% of the probability mass of the variable) the value of the 
interaction term falls in the range in which any increase in the interaction term will 
involve reductions in their sales growth rate. If we isolate the effect of bank 
competition, the value of the Lerner index that maximises the sales growth rate 
(evaluated as the mean value of financial dependence) is 0.38, against a mean sample 
value of 0.39. As a consequence, once again, firms (over 5,700 of the sample firms, 
                                                 
10 A further reason why a certain level of bank market power may favour economic growth is as a result 
of a possible trade-off between bank competition and financial stability, although the theoretical literature 
is not unanimous on this issue (see Allen and Gale, 2004). 
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approximately half of those included in the analysis) that maintain banking relationships 
with banks whose Lerner index is over 0.38 will grow, ceteris paribus, at a slower rate 
than firms operating with banks whose Lerner index value is below 0.38. If we bear in 
mind that the value of the Lerner index increased in the period analysed (see Fernández 
de Guevara and Maudos, 2006b), this increase in market power will have prejudiced the 
growth of a large number of Spanish firms. Obviously, the negative effect of 
maintaining banking relationships with banks with high levels of market power will be 
greater for firms with high level of financial dependence. Thus, according to figure 4, 
the annual sales growth could be negative for high financial dependence borrowers 
working with banks with high levels of market power. 
>Insert figure 4 here< 
Finally, we can observe that the differential effect on the real growth rate of 
financial development (0.57) is greater than the effect of bank market power.   
 Some papers (Petersen and Rajan, 1995) argue that the incentives of 
monopolistic banks to establish lending relationships are greater for small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) because these firms concentrate their external borrowing from banks 
and because the problems of asymmetric information between the bank and the 
borrower are higher. For this reason, we split the sample by size and estimate two 
separate regressions, for firms with above and below 250 employees, respectively 11.  
 Table 5 shows the results for SMEs. Compared with the results for the whole 
sample (table 4), all the signs and significance of the estimates remain the same, 
although the financial development and bank competition indicators have a greater 
impact. In contrast to SMEs, the effect of financial development and bank competition 
on sales growth in large firms (table 6) is not statistically significant12. These results 
support the hypothesis that financial development constrains SME growth more 
severely and, therefore, an improvement in financial development should be expected to 
have a larger impact in regions where SMEs have a higher presence. This evidence 
coincides with the findings of Guiso et al. (2004) from extensive international firm-level 
panel data for European Union and transition economy firms. These authors argue that 
larger firms can raise funds more easily in markets at a distance from their main 
headquarters13.  
                                                 
11 Results are robust if the sample is split into firms with over 50 employees and those with fewer than 50. 
12 As the effect of financial development and bank competition on sales growth is not statistically 
significant, table 6 does not report the differential in the real sales growth rate.  
13 We have to take into account that our financial development indicator is based only on bank credit. 
Larger firms usually have access to other sources of financing through the market. 
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The greater impact of bank competition on sales growth in SMEs as compared to 
large firms may be due to the fact that, as well as being more dependent on bank 
financing, banks have more incentives to invest in relationship building because SMEs 
are more informationally opaque than large firms. Thus, SMEs are more likely to 
receive finance in non-competitive loan markets, although there is a threshold over 
which increases in market power cause slower sales growth.  
 >Tables 5 and 6 here<   
  
6. Summary, conclusions and policy implications 
Recent cross-country studies have analysed the effect of financial development 
and bank competition on economic growth. However, as far as we know, no paper has 
analysed the effect of these two financial aspects on growth at regional level. This is 
somewhat surprising if we take into account that the same arguments used to explain the 
effect of these two variables on economic growth are equally valid at regional level, 
bearing in mind the major differences in financial development and bank competition 
within the regions of the same country. 
 
The study of the effect of financial development and bank competition on 
economic growth at regional level has certain advantages. First, since there are fewer 
institutional, legal, cultural, etc. differences among regions than among countries, 
analysing regions within a country implies that those factors are more adequately 
controlled for. Second, there tends to be greater availability and homogeneity of 
financial information for regions (of a specific country) than for countries. Third, the 
relevant financial market (and therefore, the measurement of financial development and 
bank competition) is more accurately defined at regional level. And fourth, the mean 
values of the national variables used in cross-country studies may conceal important 
differences among regions.  
 
We took the Spanish case as a testing ground, and combined firm-level 
information with information on the financial markets in the provinces. The main 
innovations, given that the database used contains information on the banks that the 
borrowers deal with, were that we were able to analyse the effect of regional bank 
competition on growth, as well as the effect of the bank market power of the banks the 
borrower firm actually deals with. Moreover, apart from following the usual practice of 
taking bank market concentration as an indicator for competition, we used a competition 
indicator from the industrial organisation literature: the Lerner index. Furthermore, the 
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methodological approach used allows us to estimate Lerner indices separately for the 
loan market, rather than for all banking activity. Finally, given the availability of 
information on a province level, financial variables were measured for the 52 provinces 
(NUTS3), rather than for the 17 regional administrative territories (Comunidades 
Autónomas or NUTS2).  
 
Using a methodology that specifies the mechanism through which finance 
influences growth, our results show the positive effect of regional financial 
development (characterized by a sizeable banking sector) on the economic growth of 
firms that are more dependent on external finance. We estimate that the impact of 
regional financial development on the growth of Spanish firms is around 0.6 percentage 
points as a consequence, primarily, of the effect of financial development on the sales 
growth of small and medium firms (SMEs). The reason for this is that large firms have 
more ready access to finance from other financial institutions or markets from other 
regions (or even from other countries). 
 
Although we do not find a statistically significant effect of the average regional 
banking market competition on firms’ sales growth, bank competition does matter for 
growth. What is relevant for firms’ sales growth is not the level of regional bank 
competition, but the level of market power held by the banks the borrower deals with. 
More precisely, results also show that bank monopoly power has an inverted-U effect 
on economic growth, suggesting that the positive effect of market power on growth is 
highest at intermediate values. The effect is heterogeneous among firms according to 
the financial dependence of the industry they belong to: firms from sectors that are more 
dependent on external finance enjoy a beneficial effect from bank market power. This 
result is consistent with the literature on relationship banking which argues that bank 
competition can have a negative effect on the availability of finance for more 
informationally opaque firms by reducing the expected benefits of the investments in 
obtaining specific information from clients. Furthermore, the effect of bank competition 
(and financial development) on firms’ growth is more important for SMEs because they 
are more dependent on bank financing and because the problems that arise from 
asymmetric information on borrower quality are also more relevant in SMEs than in 
large firms. 
 
All in all, our results show that in the bank sector, neither perfect competition 
nor monopoly is the optimal banking market structure from the point of view of 
economic growth, but rather an intermediate monopolistic competition situation is most 
advantageous. Furthermore, according to conventional wisdom there is a trade-off 
between financial stability and competition in banking; some market power must 
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therefore be permitted in order to guarantee financial sector stability and, consequently, 
to promote economic growth.  
 
A policy implication arising from our results is the need to promote greater 
regional financial development with the exercise of a certain amount of bank market 
power, given the negative effect of excessive competitive rivalry in banking markets on 
economic growth. However, there is a threshold above which any increases in market 
power can be detrimental to growth, and for this reason public authorities should ensure 
that the bank sector does not step over this maximum tolerable line. According to our 
results, a bank relative margin (Lerner index) above 0.38 is prejudicial for firms’ 
growth.   
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Table 1. Number of observations in sample
NACE Rev. 
1 Industry
Number of 
observations
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages 880
16 Manufacture of tobacco products 5
17 Manufacture of textiles 232
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 
85
19 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, 
handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear 66
20 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, 
except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and 
plaiting materials 119
21 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products 167
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 
265
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 404
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 287
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 406
27 Manufacture of basic metals 182
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery 
and equipment 447
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 323
30 Manufacture of office machinery and computers 7
31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 
162
32 Manufacture of radio, television and communication 
equipment and apparatus 53
33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, 
watches and clocks 34
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
165
35 Manufacture of other transport equipment 65
36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 187
37 Recycling 15
45 Construction 1,074
50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles; retail sale of automotive fuel 651
51 Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles 2,674
52 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; 
repair of personal and household goods 354
55 Hotels and restaurants 333
60 Land transport; transport via pipelines 167
61 Water transport 25
62 Air transport 12
63 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of 
travel agencies 180
64 Post and telecommunications 26
70 Real estate activities 523
71 Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and 
of personal and household goods 63
72 Computer and related activities 78
73 Research and development 11
74 Other business activities 415
Source: SABI, INE and own elaboration
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Table 2. Financial dependence by industry. Average 1997-2003. Large firms
NACE 
Rev 1 Industry
Financial 
dependence
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages 0.391
16 Manufacture of tobacco products 0.303
17 Manufacture of textiles 0.286
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 0.342
19 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, 
saddlery, harness and footwear 
0.395
20 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; 
manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials 
0.348
21 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products 0.247
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 0.394
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 0.340
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 0.392
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 0.378
27 Manufacture of basic metals 0.273
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 0.412
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.350
30 Manufacture of office machinery and computers 0.458
31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 0.352
32 Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and 
apparatus 
0.407
33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and 
clocks 
0.207
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.195
35 Manufacture of other transport equipment 0.469
36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 0.363
37 Recycling 0.071
45 Construction 0.477
50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale 
of automotive fuel 
0.325
51 Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 
0.383
52 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal 
and household goods 
0.295
55 Hotels and restaurants 0.478
60 Land transport; transport via pipelines 0.648
61 Water transport 0.511
62 Air transport 0.654
63 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel agencies 0.352
64 Post and telecommunications 0.588
70 Real estate activities 0.674
71 Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of personal and 
household goods 
0.656
72 Computer and related activities 0.305
73 Research and development 0.538
74 Other business activities 0.556
Source: SABI and own elaboration
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the variables used
 Mean Median Max. Min. 25th percentil
75th 
percentil Std. Dev.
Real growth rate of sales 0.027 0.032 8.647 -5.215 -0.041 0.112 0.322
Financial dependence*Financial development 0.358 0.324 0.825 0.046 0.272 0.399 0.128
Financial dependence*HHI 0.045 0.041 0.147 0.006 0.035 0.052 0.015
Financial dependence*HHI2 0.002 0.002 0.022 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.002
Financial dependence*Lerner index of the market 0.137 0.134 0.261 0.021 0.118 0.146 0.035
Financial dependence*Lerner index of the market2 0.020 0.018 0.068 0.000 0.014 0.021 0.011
Financial dependence*Lerner index of banks each firm 
operates with
0.158 0.150 0.374 -0.123 0.129 0.179 0.047
Financial dependence*Lerner index of banks each firm 
operates with
0.027 0.023 0.140 0.000 0.017 0.032 0.018
S ource: S ABI, INE, AEB, CECA, UNACC and own elaboration
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Table 4. Financial development, bank competition and growth rate of sales. Total firms
     
(1)
Constant -0,313 *** -0,321 * 0,005 0,162 -1,323 -0,287 *** -0,360 ***
(0,08) (0,19) (0,41) (0,30) (1,12) (0,08) (0,09)
Financial dependence*Financial development 0,411 *** 0,416 ** 0,389 ** 0,498 *** 0,497 *** 0,409 *** 0,426 ***
(0,15) (0,18) (0,18) (0,16) (0,16) (0,15) (0,15)
Financial dependence*HHI 0,071 -5,336
(1,53) (6,16)
Financial dependence*HHI2 22,242
(24,56)
Financial dependence*Lerner index of the market -2,553 * 8,369
(1,54) (8,05)
Financial dependence*Lerner index of the market2 -17,948
(12,99)
Financial dependence*Lerner index of banks each firm 
operates with
-0,110 0,709 **
(0,11) (0,36)
Financial dependence*Lerner index of  banks each firm 
operates with
-2,310 **
(0,96)
R2 0,014 0,014 0,014 0,015 0,015 0,014 0,015
Number of observations 11.142 11.142 11.142 11.142 11.142 11.142 11.142
Differential in real growth rate 
Financial development 0,550 *** 0,556 ** 0,520 ** 0,666 0,664 *** 0,547 *** 0,571 ***
Bank competition - 0,012 -0,910 -0,468 * 1,527 -0,054 0,343 **
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
 
Note: The dependent variable is the annual growth rate of sales for the period 1997-03. The differential in real growth rate measures (in percentage terms) how much faster a 
firm belonging to a sector at the 75th percentile level of financial dependence grows with respect to a sector at the 25th percentile level when is located in a regions at the 75th 
percentage of financial development (bank competition) rather than in one at 25th percentile. All regressions include both region and sector fixed effects (not reported). * 
Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 5. Financial development, bank competition and growth rate of sales. SMEs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Constant -0,404 *** -0,436 ** 0,154 0,144 -1,723 -0,366 *** -0,451 ***
(0,09) (0,21) (0,44) (0,32) (1,25) (0,09) (0,10)
Financial dependence*Financial development 0,513 *** 0,531 *** 0,484 ** 0,615 *** 0,615 *** 0,511 *** 0,533 ***
(0,17) (0,20) (0,20) (0,18) (0,18) (0,17) (0,17)
Financial dependence*HHI 0,276 -9,493
(1,65) (6,74)
Financial dependence*HHI2 39,774
(26,59)
Financial dependence*Lerner index of the market -2,953 ** 10,716
(1,68) (9,00)
Financial dependence*Lerner index of the market2 -22,265
(14,41)
Financial dependence*Lerner index of banks each firm 
operates with
-0,167 0,790 **
(0,12) (0,38)
Financial dependence*Lerner index of banks each firm 
operates with
-2,714 ***
(1,04)
R2 0,018 0,018 0,018 0,018 0,019 0,018 0,019
Number of observations 9.938 9.938 9.938 9.938 9.938 9.938 9.938
Differential in real growth rate 
Financial development 0,670 *** 0,692 *** 0,632 *** 0,803 *** 0,803 *** 0,666 *** 0,696 ***
Bank competition - 0,046 -1,580 -0,528 * 1,907 -0,079 0,367 **  
Note: See table 4 
 32 
Table 6. Financial development, bank competition and growth rate of sales. Large firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Constant 0.076 0.255 -0.933 -0.073 1.889 0.010 0.060
(0.17) (0.53) (1.07) (0.72) (2.49) (0.18) (0.20)
Financial dependence*Financial development -0.104 -0.194 -0.114 -0.124 -0.118 -0.099 -0.103
(0.33) (0.42) (0.42) (0.35) (0.35) (0.33) (0.33)
Financial dependence*HHI -1.641 19.076
(4.53) (16.83)
Financial dependence*HHI2 -93.229
(72.95)
Financial dependence*Lerner index of the market 0.785 -14.069
(3.70) (18.42)
Financial dependence*Lerner index of the market2 25.826
(31.38)
Financial dependence*Lerner index of banks each firm 
operates with
0.297 -0.266
(0.26) (0.97)
Financial dependence*Lerner index of banks each firm 
operates with
1.503
(2.51)
R2 -0.023 -0.024 -0.023 -0.024 -0.024 -0.023 -0.023
Number of observations 1,204 1,204 1,204 1,204 1,204 1,204 1,204
 
Note: see table 4. 
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Figure 1. Financial development in the Spanish provinces. Average 1997-2003 
(Private credit/GDP). Percentages 
44% - 60%
61% - 68%
69% - 77%
78% - 122%
 
Source: Bank of Spain, INE and own elaboration. 
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Figure 2. Lerner indices by provinces. Average 1997-2003. 
0.28- 0.30
0.30 - 0.32
0.32 - 0.34
0.34 - 0.38
 
Source: AEB, CECA, UNACC and own elaboration 
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Figure 3. Herfindahl-Hirschman index of banking concentration in the Spanish 
provinces. Average 1997-2003 
  
Source: AEB, CECA, UNACC and own elaboration 
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Figure 4. The U-shaped relationship between market power and economic growth 
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Source: own elaboration. 
